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1925 
The Delaware Death Penalty: 
An Empirical Study† 
Sheri Lynn Johnson, John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg, Valerie P. Hans  
& Martin T. Wells 
 We are grateful for the invitation to participate in a symposium that 
honors a great scholar and great man, a quiet man with a strong passion 
for justice, Professor David C. Baldus. David was deeply admired in the 
academic community in which all of us participate, but in the death penalty 
litigation community to which two of us, John and Sheri, belong, he was 
almost worshipped. Unlike many experts, whom capital defense lawyers 
sometimes try to cajole, bully, or buy, David was valued for his steadfast 
pursuit of the facts. We knew from the start that he was going to track down 
the truth, and then tell it. 
 In fact, the reverence for his work, as well as his integrity, may be why in 
the death penalty litigation community he was known as “David” rather 
than “Dave”; the nickname would have seemed insufficiently respectful. 
That reverence did not, however, make David self-important. When Sheri 
first met David at Airlie (where he was presenting his findings to a group of 
death penalty litigators), he just introduced himself by his first name, talked 
about what he was working on, asked her ideas, and inquired about her 
own work. Later, someone whispered to her, “Did you know that was David 
Baldus?” and she was embarrassed to have been so unmindful of his stature 
 
 † Financial support for this research project was provided by the Cornell Death Penalty 
Project, http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/death-penalty-project/About.cfm, and by 
Cornell Law School’s faculty research funds to Valerie Hans. This paper benefited from helpful 
audience feedback at Northwestern University Law School’s Rosenthal Lectures (Eisenberg and 
Johnson); a presentation to Delaware lawyers (Johnson), a presentation to Delaware’s Superior 
Court judges (Hans), the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Blume), the American Bar 
Foundation (Hans), and the Law & Society Association conference (Hans). 
  James and Mark Flanagan Professor of Law and Assistant Director, Death Penalty 
Project, Cornell Law School. 
  Professor of Law; Director of Clinical, Advocacy and Skills Programs; and Director, 
Death Penalty Project, Cornell Law School. 
  Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Statistical Sciences, 
Cornell University. 
  Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. 
  Charles A. Alexander Professor of Statistical Sciences, Cornell University. 
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while spouting her half-baked theories. As it turns out, that was a common 
experience; three other people told her similar stories. If David knew how 
monumental his contribution was, he never let on. He just kept on. 
 But it was monumental. As Ted and Valerie, who are co-editors of the 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, observed, no empirical study has 
had as great an impact on the law in this country as David Baldus’s project 
analyzing Georgia’s death penalty sentencing regime. Its extraordinary 
influence is particularly remarkable given that it did not produce a legal 
victory.1 Even though the Georgia study featured unparalleled 
sophistication and detail, the Court disparaged the significance of those 
findings in McCleskey v. Kemp.2 
 Not content with one monumental contribution, David kept on. He 
refined his methodology and continued to work on analyzing the operation 
of the death penalty in other jurisdictions. David’s painstaking work on the 
Pennsylvania death penalty, where he added blind independent ratings of 
aggravation and mitigation—and found even larger race effects—set a 
standard that has not yet been matched, or even approached. The same can 
be said for his work on the death penalty in other states, as well as on the 
death penalty in the military. What follows does not meet the standard 
David set. Were he here, he would no doubt urge us to wait until the last 
part of our study is complete and our analysis more refined to publish 
anything. But we publish this now in acknowledgement of the vast 
influence he had on this study,3 and over much of our past work. We are 
grateful for his lead and are grateful to have known him. 
  INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1928 
 I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DELAWARE DEATH PENALTY........................ 1929 
 II. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................... 1932 
A. THE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS DATABASE ............................... 1932 
B. THE FBI SUPPLEMENTAL HOMICIDE REPORTS ................................. 1933 
C. THE DELAWARE CAPITAL TRIALS DATABASE ................................... 1935 
 
 1. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). There is some reason, however, to hope 
that it will eventually do so. Justice Powell, the author of and fifth vote in McCleskey, later 
expressed his regret. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. (1994). The only other 
case in which Powell regretted his vote, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), has since been 
reversed by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Should the day come when McCleskey too is 
relegated to the dustbin of history, much of credit will be due to David’s pioneering work. 
 2. McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279. 
 3. David’s influence on this study was not merely inspirational. He generously gave us 
coding instruments he used when studying other states. We adapted his coding instrument for 
use in Delaware. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the last five years, we have conducted an empirical study of the 
“modern era” of capital punishment in Delaware. By “modern era,” we refer 
to the time period after the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v. 
Georgia,4 which invalidated all then-existing state death penalty regimes. 
Some readers might ask, “Why Delaware?” They might observe that it is a 
small state and is not a significant national player in terms of death 
sentences imposed or death row inmates executed. While both are true, 
several features of Delaware’s capital punishment system intrigue us. First, 
Delaware has a high death sentencing rate. Prior studies revealed that in 
relation to the number of murders, Delaware has the third-highest death 
sentencing rate in the United States.5 Studying the Delaware experience 
allows us to explore the factors that may account for the relatively high rate 
of capital punishment in the state. Second, it is not a Southern state. Most 
(though not all) previous empirical studies have focused on Southern 
jurisdictions.6 Third, Delaware has used jury sentencing as well as different 
judge-sentencing schemes in capital cases. Studies of judge versus jury death 
penalty sentencing have typically compared decision-makers across 
jurisdictions, or have examined judicial overrides of jury decisions within a 
state.7 Comparison of Delaware’s capital trial experiences under these 
diverse sentencing approaches offers a rare opportunity to contrast the 
operation of jury and judge capital sentencing within a single state. Finally, 
no previous systematic empirical studies of the death penalty in Delaware 
have been conducted. Thus, for both theoretical and practical reasons, we 
determined that it would be a worthwhile capital punishment jurisdiction to 
examine. 
In this Article we present our findings to date.8 After reviewing the 
modern history of the Delaware death penalty and describing our 
 
 4. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 5. John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Explaining Death Row’s Population 
and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 172 (2004). 
 6. See, e.g., John H. Blume, Twenty-Five Years of Death: A Report of the Cornell Death Penalty 
Project on the “Modern” Era of Capital Punishment in South Carolina, 54 S.C. L. REV. 285 (2002). 
 7. See Blume et al., supra note 5, at 177–78 (comparing states with judge versus jury 
sentencing schemes); William J. Bowers, Wanda D. Foglia, Jean E. Giles & Michael E. Antonio, 
The Decision Maker Matters: An Empirical Examination of the Way the Role of the Judge and the Jury 
Influence Death Penalty Decision-Making, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2006) (contrasting the 
views and experiences of capital jurors in jury sentencing states versus states with hybrid judge–
jury sentencing systems); Christopher Slobogin, The Death Penalty in Florida, 1 ELON L. REV. 17, 
47–50 (2009) (describing problems with Florida’s judicial override of jury sentencing 
recommendations in capital cases). 
 8. This Article presents our findings on the cases in which death was sought in Delaware. 
We anticipate follow-up articles that examine these cases in more detail. Although it is 
challenging to obtain full information on homicide cases that do not proceed to capital trial, it 
would also be of substantial interest to examine the state’s selection of cases in which to seek 
the death penalty from the universe of death-eligible cases. 
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methodology, we will describe our findings regarding geographical patterns, 
racial disparities, judge–jury sentencing differences, and reversal rates. We 
leave to others to discuss what, if any, legal or policy implications might arise 
from our findings. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DELAWARE DEATH PENALTY 
As noted above, in 1972, the Supreme Court effectively held in Furman 
that the death penalty, as then administered in the United States, violated 
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.9 Like most 
jurisdictions, the death penalty statute in existence in Delaware at the time 
of Furman required the jury to decide the issues of guilt and punishment in 
the same unitary proceedings and provided no standards for the jury to 
utilize in making the life-or-death decision.10 In 1973, in State v. Dickerson, 
the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Delaware scheme was invalid 
under Furman.11 
The Delaware legislature quickly enacted a new capital punishment 
statute.12 Since Dickerson interpreted Furman as forbidding “the uncontrolled 
discretion of juries and judges in imposing the death penalty,”13 the 1974 
Delaware statute called for mandatory death sentences for anyone convicted 
of first-degree murder.14 The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the new law 
in State v. Sheppard,15 and the death penalty in Delaware was back in business. 
Over the next two years, nine individuals were sentenced to death under the 
mandatory regime.16 
But Delaware had backed the wrong constitutional horse. In 1976, the 
Supreme Court held in Woodson v. North Carolina17 and Roberts v. Louisiana18 
that mandatory capital-sentencing schemes violated the Eighth Amendment. 
In State v. Spence, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded, as it had to, that 
 
 9. Furman, 480 U.S. 238. 
 10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3901 (1953). In 1958, Delaware abolished capital 
punishment. Death Row FAQs, DELAWARE.GOV, http://doc.delaware.gov/information/deathrow_ 
history.shtml (last updated Feb. 2, 2012). It was the second state to do so. Id. In 1961, however, 
the Delaware legislature reinstated capital punishment. Id. Then-Governor Elbert Carvel vetoed 
the legislation, but the legislature overrode the veto. Id. 
 11. State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761 (Del. 1973). For a list of the nine defendants whose 
death sentences were overturned in Dickerson, see infra Appendix A. 
 12. 59 Del. Laws 943 (1974) (codified as amended at DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 636, 
4209 (2011)). 
 13. Loren C. Meyers & Gayle P. Lafferty, Capital Punishment, in DELAWARE SUPREME 
COURT: GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY 1951–2001, at 179 (Randy J. Holland & Helen L. Winslow eds., 
2001). 
 14. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 59, § 284 (1974). 
 15. State v. Sheppard, 331 A.2d 142 (Del. 1974). 
 16. See State v. Spence, 367 A.2d 983, 986 (Del. 1976). 
 17. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 18. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
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the 1974 scheme did not pass constitutional muster and set aside all nine 
sentences imposed under that scheme.19 
In May 1977, the legislature enacted a new law modeled after the 
Georgia capital-sentencing statute upheld by the Supreme Court in 1976 in 
Gregg v. Georgia.20 This scheme provided for a bifurcated trial at which the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence would be decided in the first phase. If the 
defendant was convicted, the jury would then determine the appropriate 
punishment in a separate sentencing proceeding.21 The new system allowed 
for the presentation of aggravating and mitigating evidence at the penalty 
phase.22 The jury could only sentence the defendant to death if it 
unanimously concluded that the prosecution had proven, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the existence of at least one statutory aggravating 
circumstance.23 The jury’s decision to sentence the defendant to death had 
to be unanimous and the jury’s sentence determination was binding on the 
judge.24 The new scheme also provided for automatic appellate review by the 
Delaware Supreme Court to determine “whether the evidence supported the 
finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, whether imposition of the 
death penalty was arbitrary or capricious, and whether the death sentence 
was proportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.”25 Finally, the 
1977 statute required preparation of the entire trial transcript, specific 
identification of the aggravating circumstances found by the jury, a complete 
report by the trial judge, and “administrative assistance in compiling 
information on the universe of cases to be reviewed by the Court in 
performing its proportionality review.”26 The Delaware Supreme Court 
concluded the new regime satisfied the Eighth Amendment in State v. 
White.27 
The jury-sentencing regime was in place from 1977 until 1991. In 
October of 1991, a New Castle County jury decided the highly publicized 
case of four African-American men from outside the state who, in the 
process of committing a robbery of a Brooks armored car in Wilmington, 
fatally shot the two Brooks guards.28 The jury convicted all four defendants, 
 
 19. Spence, 367 A.2d at 988. 
 20. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976). 
 21. State v. White, 395 A.2d 1082, 1086 (Del. 1978). 
 22. Meyers & Lafferty, supra note 13, at 181–82. 
 23. Id. at 182. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. (citing White, 395 A.2d at 1092–96). 
 27. White, 395 A.2d at 1097 (holding that the 1977 statute was constitutional, “except for 
the aggravating circumstances identified as ‘elderly’ and ‘defenseless’ victims . . . which 
provisions are declared unconstitutional and are severed from the Statute”). 
 28. See Robertson v. State, 630 A.2d 1084, 1086–87 (Del. 1993). For a detailed account of 
the public response to the case and its importance in the effort to reduce the jury’s role in 
Delaware’s capital-sentencing scheme, see Benjamin D. Fleury-Steiner, Kerry Dunn & Ruth 
A5_JOHNSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2012  11:12 AM 
2012] THE DELAWARE DEATH PENALTY 1931 
Kenneth Rodgers, James Llewellyn, Christopher Long, and Paul Robertson, 
and a penalty hearing ensued. After a short deliberation of two and a half 
hours, the jury could not agree unanimously on the death penalty for any of 
the men. So, all four were sentenced to life in prison without probation or 
parole.29 Responding to the public outcry, the Delaware legislature amended 
the death penalty statute in November of 1991 to eliminate jury 
sentencing.30 Under the new scheme, modeled after Florida’s capital 
punishment system, the jury’s recommendation of death was no longer 
binding on the trial judge; the court, not the jury, was vested with ultimate 
sentencing authority.31 The Delaware Supreme Court in State v. Cohen 
upheld the new judge-sentencing system.32 Finding the change merely 
procedural, the Court also upheld the new statute against a challenge that 
that the new regime could not be used in capital trials where the crime 
occurred prior to the enactment of the new law.33 
Delaware’s current capital punishment scheme was enacted in 2002. 
Earlier that year, the United States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona.34 
In Ring, the Court held that the factors that made a defendant eligible for 
the death penalty, such as the elements of capital murder or the statutory 
aggravating circumstances, had to be found by a jury.35 Thus, in July 2002, 
the Delaware legislature again revised the method for determining how 
defendants are sentenced to death.36 
The current system retains the jury’s advisory sentencing role as to 
whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, but 
requires that a jury must unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt find 
at least one statutory aggravating circumstance.37 While the ultimate 
sentencing power still resides with the judge,38 the Delaware Supreme Court 
has determined that the trial judge must give “appropriate consideration”39 
to a jury’s assessment of whether aggravation outweighs mitigation: 
The jury’s recommendation concerning whether the aggravating 
circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating 
 
Fleury-Steiner, Governing Through Crime as Commonsense Racism, 11 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 5,  
11–15 (2009). 
 29. Robertson, 630 A.2d at 1086. 
 30. Fleury-Steiner et al., supra note 28, at 15. 
 31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (2011); State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846 (Del. 1992); see 
Meyers & Lafferty, supra note 13, at 177. 
 32. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846. 
 33. Id. In six of the seven cases combined in Cohen, the murders had occurred before the 
1991 amendments were passed into legislation. Id. 
 34. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 35. Id. at 609. 
 36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 345 (Del. 2003). 
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circumstances found to exist shall be given such consideration as 
deemed appropriate by the Court in light of the particular 
circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the 
character and propensities of the offender as found to exist by the 
Court. The jury’s recommendation shall not be binding upon the 
Court.40 
II. METHODOLOGY 
To examine capital punishment in Delaware, our project relies on three 
different sets of data. To place Delaware’s experience with its capital 
punishment system in a national context, we employed two national 
databases. The first is a Bureau of Justice Statistics (“BJS”) database, Capital 
Punishment in the United States, which includes defendants sentenced to 
death during the time period of 1973–2007.41 A second national dataset is 
the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports (“SHR”), which provide data 
about murders nationwide.42 Finally, we developed the Delaware Capital 
Trials dataset based on our research team’s coding of the information in 
legal documents as well as in homicide case files in the offices of the 
Delaware Prothonotary and in the Delaware Archives, supplemented by 
information from news coverage and Delaware judges and attorneys. 
A. THE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS DATABASE 
The BJS database “Capital Punishment in the United States” tracks 
every person sentenced to death from 1973 to 2007.43 To avoid the effects 
of early uncertainty in the post-Furman44 modern death penalty era, the 
sample is limited to defendants sentenced after 1976, when the Supreme 
Court in Gregg v. Georgia established the foundation for the modern death 
penalty era.45 The BJS data contain 8701 observations, 7603 of which are 
 
 40. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1). Previously, judges were required to give “great 
weight” to the jury’s recommendation. Garden v. State, 844 A.2d 311, 314, 318 (Del. 2004) 
(remanding where a Superior Judge failed to give “great weight” to the jury’s recommendation 
of life and the jury’s recommendation of life was supportable); Garden, 815 A.2d at 342–43. 
(remanding where a Superior Judge gave substantial consideration to the jury’s 
recommendation of life, but instead imposed a sentence of death). The Delaware legislature 
subsequently revised the language in 2003 to require only “such consideration as deemed 
appropriate.” 74 Del. Laws 425 (2003).  
 41. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1973–2007 (2009) [hereinafter BJS dataset], available at http://icpsr.umich. 
edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/24961.  
 42. JAMES A. FOX & MARC L. SWATT, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS [UNITED STATES]: 
SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORTS, WITH MULTIPLE IMPUTATION, CUMULATIVE FILES, 1976–
2007 (2000), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/24801. 
 43. BJS dataset, supra note 41.  
 44. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 45. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Court approved several new death penalty 
statutes after Gregg, on the ground that they addressed the problems of arbitrariness and 
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death sentences imposed from 1977 to 2007, inclusive. Federal death 
sentences and death sentences in New York’s never-fully-implemented 
modern capital punishment system are excluded.46 Those individuals who 
entered the death row data set, exited from it (perhaps because of a 
favorable court decision), and then reentered the sample are limited to one 
observation. This leaves a sample of 7109 individual state death row 
defendants from thirty-six states with capital punishment. The BJS death row 
data include the state, year of sentence, year of arrest, race of the defendant, 
and other information.47 
B. THE FBI SUPPLEMENTAL HOMICIDE REPORTS 
The FBI SHR contains information on the vast majority of murders in 
the United States.48 Using murder data and comparing it to capital 
prosecutions or death sentences measures the “death-proneness” of a state’s 
entire criminal justice process. 
For each murder, the data include the year of the offense, the race, sex, 
age of the victim and of the defendant arrested for the offense, the county in 
which the offense occurred, and data about the nature of the murder, 
including whether it was committed in the course of certain crimes such as 
robbery, rape, burglary, or larceny.49 Crime analysts have concluded that 
 
discrimination identified in Furman. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (finding 
Texas’ death penalty system constitutional); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (finding 
Florida’s death penalty statute constitutional). New Jersey’s post-Furman death penalty statute 
became effective in 1982, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2011), New Mexico’s in 1979, N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A) (2009), and Oregon’s in 1978, OR. REV. STAT. § 163.095(e) (2009). 
 46. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004). 
 47. An alternative source of death row inmate information is the NAACP’s Death Row 
U.S.A. The NAACP data also do not contain the race of victim for those inmates on death row 
who have not been executed. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND., INC., DEATH ROW U.S.A. 
(Winter 2011), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/DRUSA_Winter_ 
2011.pdf. The NAACP list does not include a cumulative listing of all those who have entered 
death row. The BJS list has been said to miscount commutations. See Michael L. Radelet & 
Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 289, 
292 n.12 (1993). But the discrepancy seems minimal in revised BJS data. Hugo Adam Bedau, 
Background and Developments, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 25 
n.26 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997). 
 48. FOX & SWATT, supra note 42. 
 49. Id. For a discussion of the quality of the SHR data, see generally James Alan Fox & 
Marc L. Swatt, Multiple Imputation of the Supplementary Homicide Reports, 1976–2005, 25 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 51 (2009). For Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, and Montana, SHR data 
were missing for one or more years of this study. For Florida we used the number of murders 
from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement for the years 1989 through 2007. Florida 
Statewide Murders by Firearm, FLA. DEP’T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2012), www.fdle.state.fl.us/ 
Content/getdoc/332e1b3d-2648-4b06-8be5-d322f340c95d/1971_fwd_murder_firearms.aspx. 
For 1988, we used the average number of murders for the two surrounding years, 1987 and 
1989. Id. To estimate the number of murders in Kansas for the years 1999 through 2000, we 
used information from the Disaster Center. Kansas Crime Rates 1960–2010, THE DISASTER 
CENTER, http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/kncrime.htm (last visited May, 8, 2012). The 
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despite some imperfections, the murder data are among the most reliable 
crime data.50 
The SHR include unsolved homicides, and recent iterations of the data 
include imputed information for missing data.51 In this study, we use the 
non-imputed data. The non-imputed data have been reported to contain 
approximately 90% of murders, with some variation over time.52 If the data 
lack the offender’s sex, we treat the case as unsolved, as not producing a 
candidate for the death sentence, and eliminate it from the death sentence 
rate calculations.53 To the extent that arrests are followed by releases, the 
data overstate the number of offenders at risk of a death sentence. Since the 
primary purpose for which we use the SHR data is to facilitate interstate 
comparisons, rather than to ascertain the absolute level of death sentence 
rates, erroneous murder arrests are of concern only to the extent they vary 
unevenly across states. 
The SHR data allow for reasonable estimates of the number of solved 
murders in each state in each year. For comparison with the 1977 to 2007 
death row population data, we use the SHR for 1976 through 2007, except 
for Kansas, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, and South Dakota. Kansas’s 
post-Furman death penalty statute became effective in 1994.54 New Jersey’s 
post-Furman death penalty statute became effective in 1982.55 New Mexico’s 
 
data were adjusted to reflect differences in the Kansas source data and the SHR data for the 
years in which SHR data were available. For Kentucky we used the average of SHR-reported 
murders for 1987 and 1989 to estimate the number of murders in 1988. For Montana, we used 
the average of SHR reported murders for 1986 and 1988 to estimate the number of murders in 
1987 and the average of SHR reported murders for 1995 and 1997 to estimate the number of 
murders in 1996. 
 50. See John J. Donohue, Understanding the Time Path of Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1423, 1425 (1998); John J. Donohue & Peter Siegelman, Allocating Resources 
Among Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle Against Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (1998); 
Robert J. Cottrol, Hard Choices and Shifted Burdens: American Crime and American Justice at the End 
of the Century, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 517 (1997) (book review). But see Michael Maxfield, 
Circumstances in Supplementary Homicide Reports: Variety and Validity, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 671, 675–81 
(1989). The data exclude negligent manslaughters and justifiable homicides. FOX & SWATT, 
supra note 42. 
 51. FOX & SWATT, supra note 42. 
 52. Id. at 53. 
 53. Offender sex is missing for 26.8% of SHR observations after 1976, with a low of 21.1% 
in 1978 and a high of 30.2% in 1992. These rates are reasonably consistent with a report of 
unsolved homicides ranging from just below 20% in 1976 to just over 30% in the mid-1990s. 
Id. at 54. Missing data for unsolved murders are not a concern for this study because unsolved 
murders do not produce candidates for death row. 
 54. Kansas, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/kansas-1 (last 
visited June 30, 2012). 
 55. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (2005); New Jersey, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-jersey-1 (last visited June 30, 2012). New Jersey abolished capital 
punishment in late 2007, largely after the period covered by this study. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-
3b (2008); Jeremy W. Peters, Death Penalty Repealed in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/17/nyregion/17cnd-jersey.html.  
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and South Dakota’s became effective in 1979,56 and Oregon’s became 
effective in 1978.57 For these states, we limit the SHR murder data to the 
years corresponding to the potential exposure of murder defendants to the 
death penalty.58 
By comparing death row sizes with murder populations, one can 
estimate states’ relative propensities to impose the death penalty. Murder is 
clearly the crime category from which the vast majority of death sentences 
emerge. In 2008, the Supreme Court ruled in Kennedy v. Louisiana that the 
death penalty is unconstitutional for child rape and for other crimes that do 
not result in the death of the victim.59 Even before Kennedy, capital 
punishment in non-murder cases was rare. 
C. THE DELAWARE CAPITAL TRIALS DATABASE 
The database contains information from Superior Court files at the 
Delaware Archives and the Prothonotary’s offices in all three counties. 
Trained coders went through the files on site and used a detailed 
questionnaire, adapted from that used in David Baldus’s research, to code 
over 700 elements of the cases, crimes, defendants, and victims.60 File 
information was supplemented by other sources of information about the 
cases, including Delaware trial and appellate court opinions, Third Circuit 
and U.S. Supreme Court opinions, news reports, law review articles, and the 
personal knowledge of Delaware judges and attorneys. The data include 
basic case information (defendant name, dates of offense and proceedings, 
attorneys and judges, trial and penalty-phase outcomes, and outcomes of 
appellate proceedings); background information about the defendant and 
the victim; presence or absence of potentially aggravating circumstances; 
 
 56. New Mexico abolished capital punishment in 2009, after the period covered by this 
study. New Mexico, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-mexico-1 
(last visited June 30, 2012); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14 (2009). For South Dakota, see 
South Dakota, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/south-dakota-0 (last 
visited June 30, 2012); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §23A-27A-1 to -44. (1979).  Illinois abolished 
capital punishment in 2011, also after the period covered by this study. Illinois, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/illinois-1 (last visited June 30, 2012); see also 725 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/119-1 (2012). 
 57. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.095(e) (2001); Oregon, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/oregon-1 (last visited June 30, 2012). 
 58. In New Jersey, we use SHR data from 1982 through 2007. Oregon’s post-Furman 
statute became effective on December 7, 1978, so we limit its SHR data to 1979 through 2007. 
New Mexico’s post-Furman statute became effective July 1, 1979, so we limit its SHR data to 
1980 through 2007. 
 59. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 60. DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A PULASKI, Jr., EQUAL JUSTICE AND 
THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 512 (1990); see also David C. Baldus, 
George Woodworth & Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., Law and Statistics in Conflict: Reflections on 
McCleskey v. Kemp, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 251 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer 
eds., 1992).  
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presence or absence of potentially mitigating circumstances; and written 
case summaries that offer a narrative perspective on the case.61 
III. GEOGRAPHY 
We examined the distribution of death sentences by county and 
observed some intriguing geographical patterns. Although the numbers are 
small when cases and sentences are broken down by county and the 
differences do not reach traditional levels of statistical significance, we 
believe it’s important to describe the patterns we have observed. Twenty-
nine persons (59% of the total) were sentenced to death in New Castle 
County, fourteen (29%) were sentenced to death in Kent County, while only 
six (12%) of the persons sentenced to death in the modern era under the 
guided discretion statutes were sentenced to death in Sussex County.62 
That New Castle County produces the most death sentences is not 
surprising. It is by far the largest county and has the most murders. During 
the time period 1976–2007, there were 753 murders in New Castle County 
(67% of the state’s total).63 The Kent–Sussex disparity is more difficult to 
explain, however. During the time period 1976–2007, the number of 
murders in Sussex County (200, or 18% of the murders in the state) 
exceeded the number in Kent County (178, or 16% of the total).64 But 
capital trials and death sentences showed a reverse pattern. 
Both a willingness to proceed with capital trials and the decision-
makers’ tendency to choose a death sentence appear to contribute to the 
geographical pattern. According to the capital trial records obtained from 
the State Prothonotary’s offices, Kent County had proportionately more 
penalty-phase trials (twenty-eight overall) than might have been expected 
given the homicide numbers, and half of those resulted in death 
 
 61. Despite excellent cooperation from the Delaware Superior Court and the 
Prothonotary’s offices that house and manage the Superior Court files, obtaining accurate and 
complete information for the defendants in the database has presented challenges. The case 
files vary in their completeness. Police reports, especially valuable because they frequently 
include race information, are often missing. The death cases are the most complete and the 
most accurate, in part because death cases are automatically appealed, and as part of the review 
process, the penalty-phase hearing is transcribed in its entirety. Post-trial litigation of death 
cases is extensive, and we are able to cross-check case-file information with judicial reports and 
appellate opinions. Information about the nature of the crime and the defendant’s background 
is less well-developed in the files of life cases.  
 62. The numbers would be even more stark were it not for the fact that four of the last five 
individuals sentenced to death in Delaware involved crimes that occurred in Sussex County. See 
infra Appendix A. Prior to 2007, there had been only two Sussex County death cases. See infra 
Appendix A. In our initial analyses and talks to the Delaware bar, we reported the very low 
numbers. 
 63. FOX & SWATT, supra note 42. According to the Supplementary Homicide Reports, 
from 1976 to 2007, Kent County had 178 murders, New Castle County had 753 murders, and 
Sussex County had 200 murders. Id. 
 64. Id.  
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sentences.65 The other two counties appeared to be less likely than might 
have been expected, based on the homicide numbers, to proceed to full 
capital trials; furthermore, judges and juries in New Castle and Sussex 
counties selected death sentences in only about one-third of the cases. 
Other traditional county characteristics that explain geographic 
disparity are also missing. Delaware has a single elected Attorney General, 
who then appoints the State Prosecutor and the County Prosecutors,66 and it 
uses a centralized system for determining whether to seek death in a 
particular case. Thus, the answer is not likely to be found in differences in 
the death-seeking behavior of elected county prosecutors, as has been the 
case in some other states. 
Sussex County has a smaller African-American population than Kent 
(12.7% v. 24%),67 and the average incomes and education levels, factors 
that have been noted in other studies to explain geographical differences in 
death sentencing, are not significantly different.68 In short, Kent County has 
16% of the state’s murders, but produces 29% of the state’s death sentences. 
New Castle County has 67% of the state’s murders and 59% of the state’s 
death sentences. Sussex County has 18% of the state’s murders, but, as 
noted above, only six persons (12% of the death sentences) were sentenced 
to death for crimes committed in Sussex County. 
We perhaps should not overanalyze the geographical patterns; because 
of the small numbers, the differences across counties do not reach 
traditional levels of statistical significance. Nonetheless, they raise the 
possibility that homicides in the three counties could be qualitatively 
different. Alternatively, or in addition, there may be distinctive local cultures 
in the three Delaware counties with respect to the death penalty. We have 
 
 65. The analysis was limited to capital trials that proceeded to a penalty phase between 
1976 and 2007. Note that the two most recent Sussex County death sentences fall outside this 
time frame. See infra Appendix A (Powell and Small). For this analysis, only the first trial or first 
penalty hearing was counted in cases with multiple trials or penalty phases for the same 
homicide (hence, the second trials or penalty phases for David Dawson, James Riley, and Frank 
Whalen were not included in the calculations). However, the multiple trials of Steven Pennell 
were included because they covered different homicides. 
 66. See Preventing Crime, STATE OF DEL., http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/crime/ 
crimeprevent.shtml (last updated Feb. 27, 2012) (explaining the organization of criminal 
prosecution in Delaware). 
 67. See State and County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 17, 2012), http://quickfacts. 
census.gov/qfd/states/10000.html. 
 68. See Theodore Eisenberg, Death Sentence Rates and County Demographics: An Empirical 
Study, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 348, 359 (2005). The median household income in Sussex County is 
approximately $51,000 a year and the median income in Kent is approximately $53,000, while 
the percentage of persons below the poverty level is 11.7% and 12.5%, respectively. State and 
County Quickfacts, supra note 67. Similarly, the percentage of high school graduates (85.2% 
Sussex, 84.9% Kent) and of persons with a bachelor’s degree or higher (21.2% Sussex, 20% 
Kent) are also very similar. Id. 
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no strong hypotheses for these geographical patterns but report them 
because there may be others who do. 
IV. RACE 
The influence of race upon death sentences has been the subject of 
many studies, including, of course, the extraordinary work of David Baldus. 
Here, we report racial disparities measured in several ways. 
A. DEATH SENTENCES IMPOSED BY RACE 
Fifty-eight persons—fifty-seven of them men69—have been sentenced to 
death in the “modern” era of the Delaware death penalty.70 Since nine of 
those death sentences were imposed under the initial mandatory scheme, 
and were therefore automatically invalidated,71 we will focus on the forty-
nine defendants sentenced to death using one of the three guided 
discretion statutes. Of those forty-nine, only nineteen, or 39%, were white. 
Twenty-six, or 53%, were black, and four, or 8%, were Hispanic or Native 
American. In contrast, 69% of the Delaware population is white, 21% is 
black, and (as is proportionate) 8% are Hispanic.72 The starkness of the 
black–white disparity is increasing rather than decreasing over time; all of 
the last eight death sentences in Delaware were imposed upon African-
American defendants. The last white defendant to be sentenced to death in 
Delaware was Linda Charbonneau in 2004.73 
Thirty-three of the forty-nine cases, or 67%, involve a white victim.74 
Moreover, half of the fourteen black-victim cases involved more than one 
victim, while only 15% of the thirty-three white-victim cases involved more 
than one victim, suggesting that the black-victim cases that do result in death 
sentences are more aggravated than are the white victim death cases.75 
B. THE RACIAL COMPOSITION OF DELAWARE’S DEATH ROW 
There are currently fifteen men on Delaware’s death row.76 Four (27%) 
are white, eight (53%) are African-American, and three (20%) are 
 
 69. Only one woman, Linda Charbonneau, has been sentenced to death in the modern 
era. Her convictions and sentence were reversed on direct appeal, Charbonneau v. State, 904 
A.2d 295 (Del. 2006), and she was subsequently resentenced to twenty years. State v. 
Charbonneau, Def. ID # 0207003810, 2010 WL 3516430, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 2010). 
 70. For a complete list of persons sentenced to death in Delaware since 1972, see infra 
Appendix A. 
 71. State v. Spence, 367 A.2d 983, 988 (Del. 1976). 
 72. State and County Quickfacts, supra note 67. 
 73. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 74. See infra Appendix A. 
 75. See infra Appendix A. 
 76. See infra Appendix B; see also http://doc.delaware.gov/information/deathrow.shtml 
(last updated Apr. 23, 2012). 
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Hispanic.77 The combined minority population thus is 73%. The overall 
pattern (and racial disparity) is more stark than that observed nationally, 
where, of more than three thousand death sentenced inmates, 44% are 
white, 41% are black, 12% are Hispanic, and 2% are reported as other 
races.78 
Of the current death row inmates, 60% (nine) were convicted of 
murdering whites and 40% (six) were convicted of murdering African 
Americans.79 Three of the six black-victim cases involved multiple victims, 
but all of the current death row inmates sentenced to death in white-victim 
cases involved a single-victim homicide.80 
C. RACE AND EXECUTIONS 
There have been sixteen modern-era executions in Delaware, the most 
recent of which was in April of 2012. Of the sixteen death row inmates who 
were executed, eight (50%) were white, seven (44%) were African 
American, and one (6%) was Native American. Eleven (69%) of the 
executed inmates were sentenced to death for killing one or more white 
victims, and five (31%) were executed for the murder of one or more black 
victims.81 
D. RACE AND DEATH-SENTENCING RATES 
The death sentence rate—the proportion of all murders that result in a 
death sentence—measures “death-proneness” in a jurisdiction. In the next 
section, we consider changes over time in the death sentence rate in 
Delaware. But death sentence rates can also be used as a measure of racial 
disparity. Comparisons between the population and death sentences, such as 
those reported above, can be striking—as they are in Delaware—but, 
standing alone, must be interpreted cautiously. Racial discrimination might 
explain such disparities, but so might differences in underlying offense 
rates. Examination of death sentence rates for various race-of-defendant and 
race-of-victim combinations, if it reveals large disparities, is less likely to stem 
from differences in criminal behavior. 
The results of examining Delaware’s death sentencing rate by race of 
defendant and victim are dramatic. Figure 1 shows the death sentence rate 
for Delaware as a function of the race of defendant and victim. 
 
 77. For a complete list, including the race of the defendant and victim of each individual 
currently on death row in Delaware, see infra Appendix B. 
 78. Death Row Population Size and Characteristics, DEATH PENALTY FOCUS, www.deathpenalty. 
org/article.php?id=86 (last visited May 8, 2012). 
 79. See infra Appendix B. 
 80. See infra Appendix B. 
 81. For a list of the individuals executed in Delaware, see infra Appendix D. Four of the 
eleven white-victim cases involved multiple killings, and three of the five black-victim cases 
involved multiple killings. 
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FIGURE 1 
DELAWARE’S DEATH SENTENCING RATE PER 1000 HOMICIDES  













Note: Data for Delaware cover those sentenced to death from 1977 to 2011 and homicides 
from 1976 through 2008. 
From almost any perspective, it is hard to imagine what would cause 
such stark disparities. Black defendants who kill white victims are more than 
six times as likely to receive the death penalty as are black defendants who 
kill black victims (186.7 per thousand as compared to 28.5 per thousand). 
Moreover, black defendants who kill white victims are more than three times 
as likely to be sentenced to death as are white defendants who kill white 
victims (186.7 per thousand as compared to 52.0 per thousand). 
Interestingly, white defendants who kill white victims are about as likely to 
receive a death sentence as white defendants who kill black victims (52.0 per 
thousand as compared to 48.8 per thousand). The rate that stands out, 
however, is the rate for black defendants who kill white victims. 
Of course, it is theoretically possible that although these comparisons 
control for differences in murder rates, they fail to capture differences in 
kinds of murders. Is it plausible that African Americans systematically 
commit—and whites systematically are victims of—worse murders? This 
seems highly unlikely, but in the final stage of our study of Delaware, we 
hope to conclusively resolve this question in true Baldus fashion, by 
examining aggravation and mitigation in capital cases, as well as in death- 
eligible murders. In the meantime, a comparison with death sentencing 
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from Figure 1 and adds data from seven other states for the time period 
between 1977 and 2000.82 
TABLE 1 
HOW DOES DELAWARE COMPARE TO OTHER STATES DEATH SENTENCING RATES? 














Delaware 28.5 186.7 52.0 48.8 
Georgia 4.5 99.2 41.7 21.4 
Indiana 5.6 42.3 21.6 0 
Maryland 2.4 52.2 14 7.3 
Nevada 24.9 101.1 37 12.5 
Pennsylvania 17.7 48.6 22.2 11.9 
South 
Carolina 
2.9 67.8 27.1 50.3 
Virginia 3.6 64.5 18.3 23 
 Note: Data for Delaware cover those sentenced to death from 1977 to 2011 and 
homicides from 1976 through 2008. Periods of included death sentences and 
homicides for the other states are reported in Blume et al., supra note 5, at 195 
tbl.7, and generally cover death sentences from 1977 through 2001 and 
homicides from 1976 through 1998. 
Even when compared to Southern states, the Delaware death sentencing 
rate for black defendants with white victims is extremely high; it is 75% 
higher than the closest contenders, Georgia and Nevada, more than twice as 
high as that of South Carolina and Virginia, and more than three times as 
high as that of its near neighbors, Maryland and Pennsylvania. One problem 
in comparing these states to Delaware is that the figures cover somewhat 
different time periods. However, because, as we show below, the death 
penalty has declined nationwide over time, the table’s comparison is likely to 
understate the disparities between Delaware and other states. Thus, the racial 
disparities in the Delaware death sentencing rates are remarkable. 
V. DEATH SENTENCING RATES AND JUDGE–JURY DIFFERENCES 
One benefit of describing the national pattern of death sentence rates 
over time is that the national trend can then provide a background rate, a 
 
 82. The data for the seven other states can be found in Blume et al., supra note 5, at 195–
97. 
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kind of quasi-control group, against which to evaluate change over time in 
particular states, such as Delaware. Our strategy is first to describe the 
national pattern of changes over the time period, and then to identify the 
Delaware-specific factors that we want to investigate, and are able to explore 
with these data. 
A. NATIONAL DEATH SENTENCE RATES 
Figure 2 shows the pattern of death sentence rates and the number of 
death sentences over time. The numbers representing the data points are 
the number of death sentences in a year. The figure shows a steady increase 
in death sentence rates in the first decade of the modern capital 
punishment era, a decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a near-steady 
rate from the early 1990s to about 2000, and a sharp drop beginning at 
about the turn of the century. The death sentence rate in the most recent 
years is less than half of its peak from 1986 through 1988. The number of 
death sentences was fairly steady, about 200 to 300, for well over a decade, 
from the early 1980s through about 2000. A sharp drop in the number 
began in 2001 and continued through 2006–07, and in the most recent data 
we use, is only about 100 per year. 
 
FIGURE 2 




















Explaining this national pattern is methodologically challenging due to 
interstate variation in death penalty statutes, variation in law enforcement 
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processes, and likely changes over time in the factors that influence death 
sentence rates. One wants to account for both factors that change over time, 
such as the time from arrest to sentence discussed below, as well as for any 
underlying global change associated with time. Capturing both a global time 
trend as well as the influence of time-varying factors can be difficult. 
One important development is the emerging recognition that innocent 
people are convicted of crimes. Indeed, as this article goes to press, the 
Death Penalty Information Center lists 140 death row inmates as having 
been exonerated.83 News coverage of death row exonerations is substantial,84 
with a peak in 2000 when Illinois Governor George Ryan announced a 
moratorium on executions in Illinois unless he could be convinced that no 
innocent person would be executed.85 Increased concern over sentencing an 
innocent individual to death might well affect the frequency of death 
sentences. 
Another likely factor in the rate decline is the increased cost of 
processing capital cases. One proxy for that cost is the time between arrest 
and imposition of a death sentence. The available BJS data allow assessing 
the elapsed time between arrest and death sentence of the period studied, 
subject to the limitation of substantial missing arrest-year data in the early 
years. Figure 3 shows a notable change over time in the period between 
arrest and sentencing. The figure’s solid line shows the mean time between 
arrest and death sentence for all states combined. The mean time grew from 
about eleven months in 1980 to about thirty-eight months in 2007. So the 
pool of murders leading to death sentences in the early years of this study is 
closer in time to the year of the death sentence than is the pool of murders 
for more recent years. The missing arrest data, noted above, do not lead to a 
materially different trend in the earlier years. But the last few decades 
indicate that defining the pool of murders using a uniform one-year lag may 
oversimplify the temporal relation between murders and death sentences. 
The other lines in Figure 3 show the time trend by state for the three states 
with the largest death rows, California, Florida, and Texas. The increasing 
trend over time is not solely a function of these states, and the trend in these 
states is consistent with the overall trend.  
  
 
 83. See Innocence and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty (last updated Feb. 7, 2012). 
 84. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, SUZANNA L. DE BOEF & AMBER E. BOYDSTUN, THE DECLINE OF 
THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE DISCOVERY OF INNOCENCE 52 (2008). 
 85. Id. at 67. 
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For death sentences from 1977 through 1994, the median arrest year 
was about one year earlier. For death sentences imposed from 1995 through 
2005, the median year of arrest was about two years earlier. For death 
sentences imposed in 2006 and 2007, the median arrest year was about 2.5 
years earlier. 
There are several other reasons why the number of death sentences may 
be declining. One is that life without parole is now an option in every death 
penalty jurisdiction.86 The availability of life without parole makes both 
prosecutors less likely to seek death and juries less likely to impose the death 
penalty.87 The decline in death sentences is also almost certainly 
attributable, at least in part, to declining public support for capital 
punishment. Over the last decade, the number of Americans who are in 
favor of the death penalty has dropped to its lowest level in fifty years.88 
According to recent polling data, 61% of the American people support the 
 
 86. John H. Blume, “The Times They Are A-Changin’” (or are they?), CORNELL L. F., Spring 
2010, at 18, 20. 
 87. Id. Prosecutors are less likely to seek death because issues of future dangerousness are 
greatly reduced if it is virtually certain the person will never be released back into society. 
Additionally, it is easier for prosecutors to persuade a surviving victim’s family members to 
agree to a negotiated settlement of the case and avoid a capital trial when they can be assured 
that the perpetrator will die in prison.  
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death penalty.89 However, when offered alternatives to capital punishment, 
including life without parole, public support drops to 49%.90 This changing 
view of capital punishment would logically tend to influence both 
prosecutorial and jury behavior since, in most jurisdictions, the jurors have 
to unanimously agree that the death penalty is the appropriate 
punishment.91 Additional factors that might be associated with change in 
death sentence rates are Supreme Court rulings regarding the 
constitutionality of the execution of juveniles and those suffering from 
mental retardation, but neither of these affected a large number of death 
sentences.92 
B. DELAWARE-SPECIFIC STATUTORY CHANGES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON DEATH 
SENTENCE RATES 
Many factors are likely at work at the state and local level which cannot 
be fully accounted for due to difficulty in quantitatively representing them as 
well as limitations on knowledge of the factors. In any particular state, 
however, detailed institutional knowledge can supply additional factors for 
comparison to the national rate. In this analysis, we consider Delaware’s 
changes in capital-sentencing laws over the time period, in particular, the 
statutory changes in judge versus jury capital sentencing. We now seek to 
evaluate the impact of these statutory shifts on the death sentence rate by 
using the national pattern we have identified. Whatever the complex factors 
shaping the national pattern, Figure 2 shows the resulting rises and falls in 
death sentencing rates. One can think of this time pattern as representing 
all influences on death sentence rates, even if we cannot identify or observe 
the influences individually. If we can reasonably assume that Delaware 
experienced roughly the same influences shaping the national pattern, by 
accounting for the Figure 2 pattern in models, we can then explore how 
Delaware-specific variations may have influenced changes in Delaware death 
sentence rates. 
Figure 4 shows death penalty sentencing rates over time, both nationally 
and in specific states, including Delaware. The sentencing rate calculates the 
number of death sentences over the number of homicides in the time 
period and in the state. Figure 4 displays the death sentence rate over the 
 
 89. Death Penalty, GALLUP, www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last visited 
May 8, 2012). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (2011). 
 92. This is true because prior to the Court's decisions establishing categorical bans, a 
majority of death penalty states had abolished the practice of sentencing juveniles or persons 
with mental retardation to death. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–66 (2005); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–16 (2002). Even in those jurisdictions which still allowed the 
practice, death sentences were rarely imposed on individuals in those two categories. Roper, 543 
U.S. at 564–65; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. 
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years of the modern death penalty era through 2007. The line represented 
by the shortest dashes represents the death sentence rate for all states other 
than Delaware. The rate has remained between 1% of murders and about 
3% of murders throughout the modern era. 
In addition to excluding Delaware, this line differs from the pattern 
shown in Figure 2 in a few ways. The Figure 4 line is in a figure that includes 
a much broader range of death sentence rates than the range in Figure 2. 
The 1% to 3% range adequate for the national pattern is inadequate to 
describe Delaware’s annual death sentence rates. In some years, the 
Delaware death sentence rate exceeded 20%, though some of this volatility 
likely stems from Delaware being a small state with a correspondingly small 
number of murders. The need to expand the scale of the y-axis makes the 
national trend line in Figure 4 appear to be much smoother than the 
national pattern as represented in Figure 2. 
Figure 4 includes the death sentence rate over time for two states other 
than Delaware. We chose Pennsylvania and Maryland because both border 
Delaware and have capital punishment. Thus, we consider the pattern in 
those states to evaluate the possibility that some regional factor explains 
Delaware’s deviation from the national pattern. Figure 4 includes vertical 
lines for 1991 and 2002 that represent the two major statutory changes in 
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The Delaware-specific story suggested by Figure 4 is that, until the shift 
to greater judge involvement in sentencing in 1991, Delaware’s death 
sentence rates did not materially differ from those of other states. Delaware’s 
rate was higher from 1977 to 1985, then dipped below the national rate 
until 1990, and slightly exceeded it in 1991. Corresponding to the adoption 
of increased judicial involvement in capital sentencing, Delaware’s rate both 
rose and became volatile through 2002. The volatility was largely 
unidirectional in the sense that Delaware’s rate rarely dipped below the 
national death sentence rate and, on average, was much higher. Delaware’s 
rate calmed down in 2002 but still generally remained above the national 
rate. Figure 4’s Pennsylvania and Maryland lines support the impression 
created by comparing the national line with Delaware’s line; Delaware’s rate 
jumped compared to those two states in 1991 as well, and, on average, has 
remained well above both states’ rates ever since. 
C. REGRESSION MODELS OF DELAWARE SENTENCING RATES 
Although Figure 4 is compelling and gives us a sense that the statutory 
changes in decision maker roles were associated with changes in death 
sentencing rates, one limitation of Figure 4 is that it cannot establish the 
statistical significance of Delaware’s death sentence rate. To explore whether 
the pattern suggested by Figure 4 is statistically significant, we employ 
regression models. In those models, we wish to account for the national 
“background” time pattern of death sentence rates reflected in Figure 2. 
The background rate can be thought of as capturing all non-Delaware-
specific factors, whatever they are, that produce Figure 2’s time pattern. 
A simple time term cannot adequately represent time and the 
background national trend because it is obviously nonlinear. Several 
techniques exist to capture and control for nonlinear trends.93 We use 
fractional polynomial models, which are often employed to model a 
nonlinear pattern when primary interest is in the covariates, but time must 
be controlled for.94 
 
 93. Alternatives to the approach we employ (fractional polynomial models) include using 
time (year) polynomial terms with multiple powers. It appears from Figure 2 that a polynomial 
of degree five would be needed to capture the various inflection points. Other approaches 
include splines (which fit different lines to the data at obvious breakpoints) and partial linear 
models. 
 94. E.g., David A.M. Peterson, Lawrence J. Grossback, James A. Stimson & Amy Gangl, 
Congressional Response to Mandate Elections, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 411 (2003); Patrick Royston, 
Gareth Ambler & Willi Sauerbrei, The Use of Fractional Polynomials To Model Continuous Risk 
Variables in Epidemiology, 28 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 964 (1999). 
  On the issue of lags, the change over the time period of this study in the time between 
arrest and death sentence complicates estimating death sentence rates. Computing death 
sentence rates by associating death sentences with murders in a single prior year (the year 
preceding sentence, for example) is not fully satisfactory. Figure 3 shows a notable change over 
time in the period between arrest and sentencing. The pool of murders leading to death 
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In addition to accounting for time, we include in our regression models 
variables that seek to assess any of Delaware’s distinctive effects. Since 
Delaware allowed judges to sentence in 1991, we want to assess Delaware’s 
death sentence rate while accounting for any effect that may be distinctive to 
the sentencing role it gives to judges, but is not unique to Delaware. That is, 
we want to assess whether Delaware’s death sentence rates are a generic 
consequence of its use of judges or more specific to Delaware. To do this, we 
characterized the death sentencing scheme of all states with an eye towards 
the role of the judge in sentencing.95 
A third variable we have included in our model is exonerations.96 To 
pick up state-level exoneration effects, we include a variable that includes 
 
sentences in the early years of this study is closer in time to the year of death sentence than is 
the pool of murders for more recent years. The last few decades show that defining the pool of 
murders using a uniform one-year lag may oversimplify the temporal relation between murders 
and death sentences. To reflect the changing elapsed time between arrest and sentence, we use 
a pool of murders that reflects this shifting pattern. We inspected the pattern of arrest years for 
each death sentence year and employ the following algorithm for constructing a measure of the 
pool of murders from which death sentences were drawn. For each year of death sentences we 
calculate a death sentence rate using murder arrests from previous years or the current death 
sentence year that accounts for at least 75% of the year’s death sentences with known arrest 
years. For death sentences imposed from 1977 through 1982, we use the average number of 
murders in the death sentence year and the prior year as the denominator (the pool of 
murders) in calculating death sentence rates. For death sentences imposed from 1983 through 
1987, we use the average annual number of murders in the present year plus the two prior 
years. For death sentences from 1988 through 1994, we use the average number of murders in 
the three prior years. For 1995 through 2004, we use the average number of murders in the 
four prior years. For death sentences in 2005, 2006, and 2007, we use the average annual 
number of murders in the prior five years. 
 95. Of the judicial-sentencing states most directly affected by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002), Arizona and Colorado implemented jury sentencing after Ring. For example, Arizona 
requires full jury participation in capital sentencing. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01(D) 
(2012). Idaho also moved to full jury participation. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515 (2011). 
Montana enacted anticipatory legislation in 2001 making it a hybrid state, which prohibits the 
judge from increasing a sentence in criminal cases tried before a jury unless the jury 
unanimously finds that “the enhancing act, omission, or fact occurred beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-1-401 (2011). 
  Of the hybrid states, Florida, the largest capital punishment state seemingly affected by 
Ring, has done nothing. See generally Slobogin, supra note 7. Florida continues to employ its pre-
Ring system despite repeated constitutional challenges, all of which have been rejected by the 
Florida Supreme Court. E.g., Hodges v. State, 55 So.3d 515, 540–41 (Fla. 2010) (holding Ring 
inapplicable). So Florida continues to be a hybrid state in the Supreme Court’s taxonomy. The 
same appears true for Alabama. E.g., Doster v. State, 72 So.3d 50, 105 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). 
Indiana amended its statute in 2002 so that the jury now has to find the presence of aggravating 
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and the judge must follow the jury's unanimous 
recommendation as to death, life, or term of years. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e) (2011). As of 
2002, therefore, Indiana should be characterized as a jury-sentencing state. Delaware changed 
its statute in 2002 as described above and remains a hybrid state. See supra notes 36–40 and 
accompanying text. 
 96. We include this variable despite the fact that there have been no official exonerations 
in Delaware to date because, as noted above, exonerations have played a major role in 
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the number of death sentence exonerations in each state in each year. An 
exoneration in a particular year might not be expected to have its maximum 
effect on death sentences in that year, since the death sentencing process 
now takes multiple years and is shaped by prosecutorial decisions as well as 
by judge and jury adjudication. Preliminary analysis suggests the strongest 
association between exonerations four years before the year of sentencing. 
Other scholars have also justified a four-year lag.97 We therefore use a four-
year lag of exonerations in our regression models. 
Finally, we wish to account for changes in Delaware law. To account for 
changes in the decision-maker, we include three dummy variables in the 
regression models: The first variable accounts for Delaware law up to 1991 
and is equal to one for Delaware for years prior to 1991; the second variable 
accounts for Delaware’s initial judge-sentencing regime and equals one for 
the period 1991 through 2002; and the third variable accounts for the 2002 
statutory change and equals one for the period after 2002. 
A further complication is introduced by the fact that each state in our 
data is observed multiple times (one death sentence rate for each state for 
each year), so we also need to account for the non-independence of 
multiple observations of the same state. The dependent variable, the 
number of death sentences in a state in a year, is binomial in that a death 
sentence is imposed or not imposed in each murder case. We therefore 
need to use a model that accounts for the number of events (murders) from 
which death sentences might be drawn. To implement all these features, we 
use appropriate generalized estimating equations with the state as an 
identifier variable. A fractional polynomial of degree three was used to 
model background time effects. 
Table 2 reports the results. Model (1) includes the Delaware dummy 
variables, a variable representing lagged exonerations, and the nonlinear 
time term (not reported). Model (2) adds a variable representing states with 
hybrid sentencing systems, and model (3) adds a variable for states with 
judge-sentencing systems. 
Since the Delaware dummy variables span the time period of the data, 
the coefficients on those variables are in comparison to states other than 
Delaware. Thus, the coefficient on the “Delaware to 1991” variable indicates, 
in all three models, that Delaware’s death sentence rate was not significantly 
different from that of other states up to 1991. Some caution is in order 
because the number of cases in Delaware is relatively small overall, and a 
failure to find statistical significance could be due to the low numbers. Even 
so, the coefficient on the “Delaware 1991 to 2002” variable is highly 
 
reshaping perceptions of the death penalty and likely help shape the national time pattern in 
Figure 2.  
 97. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 84, at 207 (“[I]t will take about four years for effects 
[on death sentences] to reach their full impact.”). 
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statistically significant in all models. This supports the theory that the 1992 
Delaware change to judge sentencing led to Delaware’s death sentence rate 
increasing relative to that of other states. The coefficient on the “Delaware 
post-2002” variable is not statistically significant, suggesting that the law 
change in 2002 (or some coincident event) brought Delaware’s death 
sentence rate back down relative to that of other states. Note that the 
positive sign on this coefficient corresponds to the elevated location of 
Delaware’s line in Figure 3, which remained above that of other states after 
2002. 
Also of interest are the within-Delaware effects. The highly significant 
“Delaware 1991 to 2002” coefficient and the consistent negative sign on the 
“Delaware to 1991” coefficient suggest a statistically significant difference 
within Delaware for these two time periods. This is consistent with Figure 4’s 
sharp visual difference between these two time periods. Other within-
Delaware effects can be assessed using the probabilities reported in Table 2’s 
last two rows. The last row tests the hypothesis that the coefficient for 
Delaware to 1991 equals the coefficient for Delaware after 2002. That 
difference is significant or near significant in all three models. The reduced 
effect in models (2) and (3) likely is due to the inclusion in those models of 
the hybrid dummy variable, which is coded one for Delaware as of 1991. 
The hybrid dummy likely is picking up some of the within-Delaware effect 
since Delaware was not a hybrid state until 1991. The penultimate row tests 
the hypothesis that the coefficient for “Delaware 1991 to 2002” differs from 
that for Delaware after 2002. The difference is statistically significant in 
model (3) but not in the other two models. Since model (3) only adds a 
variable (insignificant) for judge-sentencing states, it is not clear what the 
interpretation of that difference should be. 
It is interesting to observe that the exonerations variable is statistically 
significant in all three models. The (lagged) effect of exonerations in a state 
is associated with a reduction in death penalty sentences. 
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TABLE 2 
BINOMIAL REGRESSION MODELS OF THE NUMBER OF INMATES ON DEATH ROW 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Dependent variable = number of inmates on death row 
Delaware to 1991 -0.605 -0.345 -0.338 
 (1.151) (1.009) (1.005) 
Delaware 1991 to 2002 1.468*** 1.238*** 1.239*** 
 (0.495) (0.469) (0.468) 
Delaware post-2002 0.874 0.671 0.672 
 (0.743) (0.684) (0.683) 
Hybrid judge–jury 
sentencing state  0.377*** 0.379*** 
  (0.093) (0.093) 
Judge-sentencing state   0.023 
   (0.129) 
Exonerations in state, by 
year, lagged -0.053** -0.060** -0.059** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
Nonlinear time trend 
variables Not shown 
Observations 1021 1021 1021 
Number of states 36 36 36 
Prob. Delaware 1991 to 
2002 = Delaware post-
2002 
0.179 0.173 0.0170** 
Prob. Delaware to 1991 = 
Delaware post-2002 0.0270** 0.0939* 0.0945* 
Note: The regression models cover death sentences from 1978 to 2007 and the observations for 
each year are at the state level. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p <.1; ** p<.05; ***p <.01 
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VI. APPEALS AND ERROR RATES 
The Delaware Supreme Court has decided fifty-five cases on direct 
appeal,98 reversing the conviction in four cases and the sentence in eleven 
more, and the United States Supreme Court ordered resentencing in an 
additional case after the judgment was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme 
Court. The combined error rate on direct appeal was thus 29%. Twelve of 
those sixteen individuals were subsequently resentenced to life in prison or a 
prison sentence, and two were subsequently resentenced to death and 
ultimately executed. One is currently on death row, and the other was 
retried and his sentencing is pending.99 
Four death sentenced inmates obtained new trials, either as to guilt or 
penalty, in state post-conviction proceedings, and two were successful in 
federal post-conviction proceedings. This yields an overall error rate of 
40%.100 Of the four inmates who prevailed in state post-conviction, three of 
the four were resentenced to death; of the two inmates who prevailed in 
federal habeas corpus, both were resentenced to life imprisonment.101 
While clemency is not, technically speaking, part of the appellate 
process, it is relevant to the question of error rates. There has been only one 
grant of clemency. Robert Gattis was recently granted executive clemency in 
a high-profile decision heralded in a New York Times editorial.102 Delaware 
 
 98. The number of appeals is greater than the number of persons sentenced to death 
under the guided discretion statute because some persons had their convictions or sentence 
reversed and then were resentenced to death and appealed again. For a list of all the cases 
decided on direct appeal, see infra Appendix E. 
 99. See infra Appendix E.  
 100. According to Professors James Liebman, Andrew Gelman, and their colleagues’ 
Broken System Studies, across the United States at least one error is found in 68% of capital 
cases. JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973–1995 
(2000) [hereinafter BROKEN SYSTEM I]; JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., WHY THERE IS SO MUCH ERROR 
IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2002) [hereinafter BROKEN SYSTEM II]; 
Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Pattern of Reversals of Death Sentences in the 
United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209, 217 (2004). 
 101. For a chart establishing the types of errors found in Delaware cases, see infra 
Appendix F. We would also note that two things of significance have not happened in Delaware. 
The Delaware Supreme Court has not found that any death sentence imposed by a jury or 
judge was disproportionate to the offense or to the sentence imposed in a similar case, and 
there have been no official exonerations in the state to date. We also examined whether the 
error rates were different in the three capital sentencing schemes that Delaware has used. 
During the jury sentencing era, the overall error rate (including direct appeal and post-
conviction) was 60%. In the judge sentencing era, the overall error rate is 33% to date with 
some cases still pending. Under the current scheme, where the judge determines death 
eligibility and the judge sentences, the overall error rate to date is also 33%, but all cases 
affirmed on direct appeal are still pending elsewhere in the capital appeals process. For a list of 
inmates sentenced to death in Delaware by capital sentencing scheme, see infra Appendix C. 
 102. Gattis was granted clemency on January 17, 2012. Sean O’Sullivan, Markell Spares Gattis 
the Death Penalty, NEWS J. (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.bishop-accountability.org/news2012/ 
01_02/2012_01_17_OSullivan_MarkellSpares.htm; Editorial, A Death Penalty Commutation, N.Y. 
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Governor Jack Markell’s decision followed an unusual four-to-one 
recommendation in favor of clemency by the state’s Board of Pardons.103 
Governor Markell based his decision on the fact that the jury that sentenced 
Gattis to death did not hear a full presentation of the mitigating evidence 
regarding his family background.104 As a result, Gattis’s death sentence was 
commuted to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, 
conditional upon his willingness to forego any future challenges to his 
conviction and life sentence. 
The implications of high error rates are open to dispute. Some might 
argue that a high error rate indicates the appellate review system is working, 
while others might say that high error rates reflect the fallibility of the 
system, and that a system charged with determining who should live and who 
should die should not make substantial numbers of mistakes. Another way to 
look at this question is to consider whether the results after retrial validate 
the original decision to impose death. Here the answer is clearer: In 
Delaware, 68% of the individuals whose death sentences were reversed have 
been resentenced to life imprisonment.105 Indeed, more than a third of all 
individuals sentenced to death in Delaware during the period under study 
eventually were resentenced to life imprisonment.106 
 
TIMES (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/opinion/a-death-penalty-
commutation.html. 
 103. Jack Markell, Govenor, State of Del., Statement of Govenor Jack Markell Regarding 
the Commutation of Sentence of Robert Gattis (Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://news. 
delaware.gov/2012/01/17/statement-of-governor-jack-markell-regarding-the-commutation-of-
sentence-of-robert-gattis/. The Board of Pardons cited several reasons for the majority’s 
recommendation. The defendant’s significant history of childhood sexual abuse and possible 
mental illness had not been fully presented to the judge and jury that decided his punishment. 
Board of Pardons, State of Del., Board of Pardons Recommendation to Governor Markell 
Regarding Clemency of Robert Gattis (Jan. 15, 2012), available at http://news.delaware. 
gov/2012/01/15/board-of-pardons-recommendation-regarding-clemency-of-robert-gattis/. 
Furthermore, Board members noted that the jury had not been unanimous in its punishment 
recommendation (it had voted in favor of aggravating factors outweighing mitigating factors by 
a ten to two split), and they expressed concern “that our death penalty statute permits the 
imposition of death on the basis of a non-unanimous verdict.” Id. The Board’s statement also 
expressed worry about observed disparities in the sentences meted out for comparable crimes 
in Delaware. Id. 
 104. See Jack Markell, supra note 103. Markell concluded: “After my review, I find myself in 
agreement with the four members of the Board of Pardons who concluded the mitigating 
evidence here is sufficiently substantial that an act of clemency on my part is warranted. In 
doing so, I am committed to the fact that Mr. Gattis will spend his remaining life in prison and 
will pose no threat to public safety.” Id. 
 105. See infra Appendix A.  
 106. Since most death sentenced inmates in Delaware still have appeals pending, the 
number who eventually leave death row exonerated or with lesser sentences will inevitably be 
higher. 
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CONCLUSION 
Our conclusions are limited to three main observations. First, 
Delaware’s reversal rate of 40%, while considerable, is also substantially 
lower than that of other jurisdictions. This may not be surprising given that 
jury verdicts offer more opportunities for reversal, and indeed, reversal rates 
during the jury-sentencing period approximate the national average.107 
Our second observation is that judge-sentencing results in more death 
sentences. This may surprise no one; indeed, the presumption that judges 
would be more willing than juries to impose capital punishment appeared to 
motivate the statutory change to judge sentencing.108 Whether the 
mechanism behind greater judicial harshness is the absence of a need for 
unanimity, political pressure, or something else, our model reveals that 
judge sentencing produces more death sentences. Moreover, this effect is 
more pronounced in Delaware than in other states. Thus, putting aside 
whether the Delaware Supreme Court was right as a legal matter that judge 
sentencing could be retroactively applied to cases where the crime occurred 
during a jury-sentencing regime, the change it labeled “procedural” affected 
the likelihood of receiving a death sentence in a statistically significant way. 
Finally, we find a dramatic disparity of death-sentencing rates by race, 
one substantially more pronounced than in other jurisdictions. This finding 
calls for more investigation, and also serves as a fitting conclusion to this 
Article’s tribute to David Baldus. As he told us more than a quarter of 
century ago, race matters in capital sentencing, and we need to continue to 
pursue knowledge about where, when, and how. 
  
 
 107. See supra notes 100–01. 
 108. Fleury-Steiner et al., supra note 28. 
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APPENDIX A  
DELAWARE DEATH SENTENCES 














Richardson, Roy W/M    
Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 
Eaton, Phillip W/M    Resentenced to Life Imprisonment 
Shields, Linwood 
(Juvenile) B/M    
Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 
Foraker, Franklin W/M    Resentenced to Life Imprisonment 
Carpenter, Allen W/M    
Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 
Golson, Robert B/M    Resentenced to Life Imprisonment 
Hooks,  Clarence B/M    
Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 





B/M    Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 
Whalen, Frank W/M W/F Kent 4/28/78 
Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 
Flamer, William B/M B/M B/F Kent 2/15/80 Executed 
Bailey, Billy W/M 
W/M 
W/F Kent 3/10/80 Executed 
Rush, David W/M W/M New Castle  Resentenced to Life Imprisonment 
Deputy, Andre B/M 
B/M 
B/F Kent 4/1/80 Executed 
Riley, James B/M W/M Kent 12/20/82 
Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 
Deshields, Kenneth B/M W/F Sussex 4/4/86 Executed 
Sanders, Reginald B/M W/M Kent Oct-86 
Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 
Dawson, David W/M W/F Kent 7/24/88 Executed 
Pennell, Steven W/M W/F W/F New Castle Aug-91 Executed 
Red Dog, James NA/M W/M New Castle 4/16/92 Executed 
Sullivan, Willie B/M W/M Kent 10/30/92 Executed 
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Gattis, Robert B/M B/F New Castle 10/29/92 
Sentence 
Commuted to Life 
Imprisonment 




B/M B/M New Castle 12/7/92 Executed 
Jackson, Robert W/M W/F New Castle 4/28/93 Executed 
Shelton, Nelson W/M W/M New Castle 4/30/93 Executed 
Shelton, Steven W/M W/M New Castle 1/12/92 Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 
Outten, Jack W/M W/M New Castle 4/30/93 
Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 




Kent 7/9/93 Executed 
Weeks, Dwayne B/M 
B/M  
B/F New Castle 7/9/93 Executed 
Clark, James W/M 
W/M 
W/F New Castle 1/5/95 Executed 
Steckel, Brian W/M W/F New Castle 1/8/97 Executed 
Stevenson, David B/M W/M New Castle 
1/10/97; 
2/3/06 Pending 
Manley, Michael B/M W/M New Castle 1/10/97; 
2/3/06 
Pending 
Zebroski, Craig W/M B/M New Castle 8/18/97 Pending 
Barnett, Jermaine B/M W/M New Castle 2/3/98 Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 
Barrow, Hector B/M W/M New Castle 2/3/98 Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 
Ashley, Robert W/M B/M New Castle 3/19/99 Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 
Capano, Thomas J. W/M W/F New Castle 3/16/99 Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 
Flonnory, Freddie B/M B/F 
B/F 
New Castle 2/19/04; 
7/22/04 
Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 
Garden, Sadiki B/M W/F New Castle 3/25/01 Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 
Taylor, Milton B/M B/F New Castle 7/6/01 Pending 
Norcross, Adam W/M W/M Kent 10/3/01 Pending 
Swan, Ralph W/M W/M Kent 10/3/01 Pending 
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Cabrera, Luis H/M B/M 
B/M 
New Castle 3/14/02 Pending 
Reyes, Luis H/M B/M 
B/M 
New Castle 3/14/02 Pending 
Williams, Joseph B/M B/F New Castle 8/3/01 Resentenced to Life Imprisonment 
Ortiz, Juan J. H/M W/F Kent 9/26/03 Pending 




W/M Sussex 6/4/04 
Resentenced to  
Imprisonment for 
Term of Years 
Starling, Chauncy B/M 
B/M 
B/M New Castle 6/10/04 Pending 
Sykes, Ambrose B/M W/F Kent 9/20/06 Pending 
Cooke, James E., 
Jr. B/M W/F New Castle 6/6/07 Pending 
Norman, Allison B/M B/M Sussex Jun.-07 Resentenced to Life 
Imprisonment 
Johnson, Shannon B/M B/M New Castle 9/5/08 Executed 
Taylor, Emmett, III B/M B/F Sussex 1/12/10 Pending 
Powell, Derrick    B/M W/M Sussex 5/20/11 Pending 
Small, Leslie B/M W/F Sussex 7/22/11 Pending 
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APPENDIX B 











David B/M W/M New Castle 1/10/97; 2/3/06 
Manley, Michael B/M W/M New Castle 1/10/97; 2/3/06 
Zebroski, Craig W/M B/M New Castle 8/18/97 
Taylor, Milton B/M B/F New Castle 7/6/01 
Norcross, Adam W/M W/M Kent 10/3/01 
Swan, Ralph W/M W/M Kent 10/3/01 
Cabrera, Luis H/M 
B/M 
B/M New Castle 3/14/02 
Reyes, Luis H/M B/M 
B/M 
New Castle 3/14/02 
Ortiz, Juan J. H/M W/F Kent 9/26/03 
Ploof, Gary W/M W/F Kent 8/22/03 
Starling, 
Chauncy 
B/M 2B/M New Castle 6/10/04 
Sykes, Ambrose B/M W/F Kent 9/20/06 
Taylor, Emmett, 
III B/M B/F Sussex 1/12/10 
Powell, Derrick B/M W/M Sussex 5/20/11 
Small, Leslie B/M W/F Sussex 7/22/11 
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APPENDIX C 
NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS SENTENCED IN MODERN ERA CATEGORIZED BY  
STATUTORY SCHEME 
 * Indicates the individual was resentenced or the sentences was commuted to life 
in prison or term of years 
 ** Indicates pending new trial or new sentencing 
 *** While Pennell was sentenced (by a judge) before the 1991 amendment took 
effect, his appeals came after the amendment 
1977 Statute 
 Jury Sentences 
1991 Amendment 
 Judge Sentences; and 
 Jury Recommends 
2002 Amendment 
 Judge Sentences; 
 Jury Recommends; and 
 Jury Must Unanimously Agree 
on One Aggravating Factor 
1977–Nov. 1991 Nov. 1991–June 2002 June 2002–Present 
Whalen, Frank* Red Dog, James Ortiz, Juan J.  
Flamer, William  Sullivan, Willie Ploof, Gary  
Bailey, Billy Gattis, Robert* Charbonneau, Linda* 
Rush, David* Wright, Jermaine**  Starling, Chauncy  
Deputy, Andre  Hameen, Abduallah (AKA Cornelius Ferguson) Sykes, Ambrose 
Riley, James* Jackson, Robert Norman, Allison* 
Deshields, Kenneth Shelton, Nelson Cooke, James E., Jr.** 
Sanders, Reginald* Shelton, Steven* Johnson, Shannon 
Dawson, David Outten, Jack* Taylor, Emmett, III 
Pennell, Steven*** Lawrie, David Powell, Derrick 
 Weeks, Dwayne Small, Leslie 
 Clark, James  
 Steckel, Brian  
 Stevenson, David  
 Manley, Michael  
 Zebroski, Craig  
 Barnett, Jermaine*  
 Barrow, Hector*  
 Flonnory, Freddie*  
 Ashley, Robert*  
 Capano, Thomas J.*  
 Garden, Sadiki*  
 Taylor, Milton  
 Norcross, Adam  
 Swan, Ralph  
 Cabrera, Luis  
 Reyes, Luis  
 Williams, Joseph*  
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APPENDIX D 
DELAWARE EXECUTIONS 



























Bailey, Billy W/M W/M W/F Kent 3/10/80
Executed 
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APPENDIX E 
DELAWARE DIRECT APPEAL CASES  
1982–2011 
CASE NAME RESULT 
CURRENT 
STATUS 
Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1980), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 910 (1982). 
Reversed-S Life in Prison 
Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104 (Del. 1983), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 865 (1983). 
Affirmed Executed 
Bailey v. State, 490 A.2d 158 (Del. 1983), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 867 (1983);  Bailey v. State, 503 A.2d 1210 (Del. 
1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 873 (1985). 
Affirmed Executed 
Rush v. State, 491 A.2d 439 (Del. 1985).  Reversed-S Life in Prison 
Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 478 
U.S. 1022 (1986). 
Affirmed Life in Prison 
Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 480 
U.S. 940 (1987). 
Affirmed Executed 
DeShields v. State, 534 A.2d 630 (Del. 1987), cert. denied, 
486 U.S. 1017  (1988). 
Affirmed Executed 
Dawson v. State, 581 A.2d 1078 (Del. 1990), rev'd and 
remanded, 503 U.S. 159 (1992), 608 A.2d 1201 (1992). 
Reversed-S Executed 
Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117 (Del. 1990). Reversed-S Life in Prison 
Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1992). Affirmed Executed 
Red Dog v. State, 616 A.2d 298 (Del. 1992). Affirmed Executed 
Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931 (Del. 1994), cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 833 (1994). 
Affirmed Executed 
Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d 57 (Del. 1994). Affirmed Executed 
Gattis v. State, 637 A.2d 808 (Del. 1994), cert. denied, 513 





Wright v. State, 633 A.2d 329 (Del. 1993). Affirmed Pending 
Ferguson v. State, 642 A.2d 772 (Del. 1994), cert. denied, 
519 U.S. 1014 (1996). 
Affirmed Executed 
Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336 (Del. 1994), cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 1048 (1994). 
Affirmed Executed 
Jackson v. State, 643 A.2d 1360 (Del. 1994), cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 1136 (1995). 
Reversed-S Executed 
Outten v. State, 650 A.2d 1291 (Del. 1994), cert. denied, 
515 U.S. 1145 (1995) (for Steven Shelton and Outten). Affirmed Life in Prison 
Shelton v. State, 650 A.2d 1291 (Del. 1994). Affirmed Executed 
Weeks v. State, 653 A.2d 266 (Del. 1995).  Affirmed Executed 
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CASE NAME RESULT 
CURRENT 
STATUS 
Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 552 (Del. 1985). Reversed-S Life in Prison 
Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353 (Del. 1996), cert. denied, 
517 U.S. 1249 (1996). Affirmed On Row 
Clark v. State, 672 A.2d 1004 (Del. 1996).  Affirmed Executed 
Jackson v. State, 684 A.2d 745 (Del. 1996), cert. denied, 520 
U.S. 1171 (1997). 
Affirmed Executed 
Manley v. State, 709 A.2d 643 (Del. 1998), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 893 (1998). 
Affirmed On Row 
Stevenson v. State, 709 A.2d 619 (Del. 1998), cert. denied, 
525 U.S. 967 (1998). 
Affirmed On Row 
Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998). Affirmed Executed 
Zebroski v. State, 715 A.2d 75 (Del. 1998). Affirmed On Row 
Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del. 2000) (for Barnett 
and Barrow). 
Reversed-S Life in Prison 
Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556 (Del. 2001), cert. denied, 
536 U.S. 958 (2002). 
Affirmed Life in Prison 
(deceased) 
Flonnery v. State, 778 A.2d 1044 (Del. 2001). 
Reversed-
NT Life in Prison 
Ashley v. State, 798 A.2d 1019 (Del. 2002). Reversed-NT Life in Prison 
Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906 (Del. 2002). Reversed-S Life in Prison 
Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327 (Del. 2003).  Reversed-S Life in Prison 
Norcross v. State, 816 A.2d 757 (Del. 2003), cert. denied, 
540 U.S. 833 (2003). 
Affirmed On Row 
Reyes v. State, 819 A.2d 305 (Del. 2003), cert. denied, 540 
U.S. 862 (2003) (for Reyes and Cabrera). 
Affirmed On Row 
Swan v. State, 820 A.2d 342 (Del. 2003), cert. denied, 540 
U.S. 896 (2003). Affirmed On Row 
Taylor v. State, 822 A.2d 1052 (Del. 2003), cert. denied, 540 
U.S. 931 (2003). 
Affirmed On Row 
Garden v. State, 844 A.2d 311 (Del. 2004). Reversed-S Life in Prison 
Ploof v. State, 856 A.2d 539 (Del. 2004). Affirmed On Row 
Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285 (Del. 2005), cert. denied, 546 
U.S. 832 (2005). 
Affirmed On Row 
Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747 (Del. 2005), cert. denied, 
546 U.S. 1216 (2006). Reversed-S On Row 
Charbonneau v. State, 904 A.2d 295 (Del. 2006). Reversed-NT Prison Term 
Starling v. State, 903 A.2d 758 (Del. 2006), cert. denied, 
549 U.S. 1324 (2007). 
Affirmed On Row 
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CASE NAME RESULT 
CURRENT 
STATUS 
Manley v. State, 918 A.2d 321 (Del. 2007), cert. denied,  
550 U.S. 971 (2007) (2 defendants – Manley and 
Stevenson). 
Affirmed On Row 
Sykes v. State, 953 A.2d 261 (Del. 2008), cert. denied, 555 
U.S. 969 (2008). Affirmed On Row 
Norman v. State, 976 A.2d 843 (Del. 2009), cert. denied, 
130 S.Ct. 561 (2009). 
Reversed-S Life in Prison 
Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009), cert. denied, 130 






Johnson v. State, 985 A.2d 904 (Del. 2009), cert. denied, 
131 S.Ct. 77 (2010). 
Affirmed Executed 
Taylor v. State, 28 A.3d 399 (Del. 2011). Affirmed On Row 
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APPENDIX F 
TYPES OF ERROR DETECTED IN DELAWARE DEATH PENALTY CASES 
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